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Abstract
In this paper I argue that quality standards, products standards, and quality classes influence the
priority that firms give to different product developments. These standards may be viewed as
institutions in the sense of shared rules of behavior or codes. They have become shared because
there are increasing returns to their use. These increasing returns apply both to their functions as
means of reducing the costs of specifying and communicating product quality and to their
functions as means of reducing buyers' costs of comparing the quality of different products  - both
of which are part of transaction costs. When reliable and extensively used standards exist,
transaction costs are reduced. But these positive consequences to individual firms of adhering to
the same standards create a sort of inertia in product development. This is because developments
which are in line with existing standards will not introduce new transaction costs, while
developments which break with the conformity of the standards will. In order for the latter kinds
of product developments to be profitable, both development costs and transaction costs have to
be overcome.  
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4In models examining vertical product differentiation it is assumed that products offered at same prices are 1
ordered in preference in exactly the same way by every consumer whereas in models of horizontal product
differentiation it is assumed that they are ordered differently at same price because of differences in consumer
preferences (Krouse, 1990). To keep things simple, I shall make use of the assumtpion of same preference
ordering by all consumers in the sections 3 to 5. However, the assumption is not needed to state may case. 
1. Introduction
Product innovations offer the firm the potential of influencing market demand by meeting needs
in new ways or in meeting new needs. One of the main challenges for firms in product
development is to identify consumer preferences and market segments, since such information
helps firms target their product development in profitable directions. But information on consumer
needs is just one of the factors that influence product development. In this paper I argue that
product development is also influenced by quality standards, product standards and quality
classes. These standards serve the purpose of reducing information and transaction costs but they
also direct firms' attention toward the development of some product characteristics rather than
others.
The above mentioned standards may be viewed as institutions (shared rules of behavior) which are
reinforced by their positive consequence on transaction costs when many adhere to the same
particular standards. The point I want to make is that the positive consequences in terms of
reduced transaction costs from adherence to these standards create a sort of inertia in product
development. 
One may distinguish between three kinds of product development: vertical, horizontal and complex
(Hall, 1994) . Vertical product development is the introduction of products with higher levels of1
quality characteristics while horizontal product development is the introduction of products with
different ratios of characteristics. Finally, complex product development is the introduction of
products which contain new kinds of characteristics. I will argue that quality standards, product
standards and quality classes exert different influence on vertical, horizontal and complex
product development respectively. 
                    
In order to understand the possible influence of quality standards, product standards and quality
classes on product development, it is necessary to examine the economic rationale behind their
continued existence in the market, and the positive externalities to firms from adhering to the same
standards. For that purpose two different strands of theories are needed, namely the measurement
cost branch of transaction cost theory
 and the theory of path dependence developed by Paul
David (1987) and in particular the concept of economies of system scale. 
5The measurement cost theory indicates that transaction costs strongly depend on the cost of
product information and on the variability in product quality. Both of these sources of transaction
costs may be reduced by the existence of standards. System scale economies is the term David
(1987) uses to describe the situation in which, for example, users of a particular type of car phone
get more benefit from their phone the more subscribers they can use it to get in touch with -which
in turn depends on other subscribers using the same type of phone. I use the concept of economics
of system scale as referring to a situation where there are positive consequences to economic
agents from an increased use by others of the same standards. Buyers experience increasing benefit
in terms of reduced transaction costs (cost of comparing the offerings of different sellers) the more
widely used a standard is and some of the reduction in transaction costs may be captured by the
sellers.     
In section 2, "Standards", I give a brief explaination of terminology  and the nature of the
standards in question. In section 3. "Transaction costs and product information costs", I introduce
the measurement costs branch of transaction costs theory and discuss the relation between
information costs, transaction costs. Section 4 ,"Transaction costs and variation in product
qualities", provides a theoretical argument as to how standards reduce transaction costs. This
argument serves as a basis for examining the influence of standards on product development. The
sections 5 to 7 contain a discussion of the effect of quality standards, product standards, quality
classes and production standards on firms' incentives to engage in different kinds of product
development. Finally, in section 9, "Changes in the hierarchy of sorting criteria in quality
classes", I provide some arguments as to the factors which might cause a change in the
composition of quality classes. 
2. Standards
Quality standards, product standards and quality classes are codes which, if both parties in the
transaction know what the standard covers, make it less costly for sellers to communicate
particular quality characteristics and for buyers to obtain product information and compare the
offerings of different sellers.
Standards can be classified into technical and behavioral standards, according to whether they refer
to an object's characteristics or human behavior (David, 1987). Technical standards often consist
of well-known ordinal measurements, such as kg (lbs), mm (ins), or threshold values which state
a minimum or maximum value, while behavioral standards consist of codes for specific routines
or skills. Examples of the latter kind of behavioral standards are professional titles such as civil
engineer, doctor, etc., while Integrated Production (IP) of fruit and vegetables or ISO standards
6In fact, IP and ISO standards consists of a great number of specifications which are determined by means of2
both technical standards and behavioral standards of which the latter is in the form of a set of prescribed
routines.
are examples of the former kind of behavioral standards .IP stands for integrated production which2
is a kind of production where the aim is to reduce the use of fertilizers and pesticides, for example,
by developing alternative methods of growing. Where possible, standards will be indicated by
means of technical standards rather than behavioral standards, since the latter are often ambiguous
(David, 1987). This is due to the fact that the specifications which they contain often can be
interpreted differently by different firms. This ambiguity implies that the information value of the
standard is reduced. 
In the following, the term quality standards is used to describe standards which indicate the level
of a product's quality characteristics. For example, in fruit and vegetable markets quality standards
such as brix are used as measure of the content of dry matter in fruit juice, and the more familiar
reference standard from the metric system as indicators of the size of individual fruits and
vegetables.  
Product standards
 is the term used to describe the conditions a product must fulfil before it can
be classified into a particular category of products. One example is "real juice", which is a
designation that can only be used when the product contains pure fruit or vegetable juice. Another
example is the set of criteria on which the recognition of a fruit or vegetable as a separate variety
is based. 
The term quality class is used in the classification of raw or final products into groups of similar
levels of quality characteristics. Within each product category, individual products often vary in
a lot of their characteristics. In principle, each measurable characteristic could result in a separate
quality class. In practice, however, there seems to be a hierarchy of relatively few defining
characteristics for sorting products into groups which are common for all producers. 
Common to the above standards is that, as previously mentioned, they can function as a means of
specifying and communicating valued characteristics of the product or deliveries. However, the
reduction in transaction costs which can be achieved by using standards as a basis for specifying
characteristics and classifying products or deliveries depends on whether buyers can trust that
firms do not cheat.
Sellers can cheat on quality by disclosing wrong levels of quality characteristics, for example, by
specifying wrong sizes of ingredients. If a seller discloses wrong product standards, production
standards, or quality classes, buyers might become generally suspicious about their information
value. These problems of trust must be presumed to be greatest when the standard includes
7characteristics which the buyer has difficulty in controlling himself. One example of this is in the
juice industry, where The International Juice Organization has developed a number of common
European product standards. These standards distinguish between juice, nectar and fruit on the
basis of specifications of the fruit juice and pulp content. The small profits involved in juice
production, however, have tempted some producers to cheat by adding citric acid and other cheap
ingredients to products which they still sell under the name of juice. This has led a number of firms
in the Danish juice industry to jointly develop methods of measuring juice quality (especially its
purity). The quality of the juice is to be further guaranteed through the development of a control
programmed base on sampling juice products in shops and unannounced visits to firms. The
program is financed by the firms themselves.
Some standards may be designed by organizations, while may have emerged form the general
practice of buyers and sellers. For example, in the fruit and vegetable industry the establishment
and diffusion of general quality classes for fresh fruit and vegetables are dominated by national and
international organizations. Standards are drawn up by both the Danish food inspection agency
and by EU and OECD agencies. International quality classes for fruit and vegetables have been
in existence for more than 40 years. The first international standards were developed by UNECE
(UN Economic Commission for Europe) and the OECD. Common EU norms have been
established ever since the start of the Common Market in 1962. These norms are used in all stages
of distribution, that is, from production to sale Within the EU, 34 of the most important fruits and
vegetables are subject to EU quality norms. The EU requires that the country of origin, quality,
and variation (within the given quality classes) of fruit and vegetables is clearly marked either on
the packaging or on show cards. Fresh fruit and vegetables are classified into 4 quality classes, for
example, extra class 1 and class 2. Extra class 1 products are of an excellent and specially selected
quality, while class 2 products are of good quality without any serious defects. Class 2 products
often have one or two defects in the form of size, shape, colour, or spots. 
Processed fruits and vegetables also have their established quality classes. In jam production, for
example, the percentage of berries and berry quality (their colour, and whether they are whole or
not) are the prime criteria for classifying jam into high and low quality. For a number of
intermediate products, for example, berries for stewed fruit, jam, and squash and squash
concentrates, which are purchased in bulk, there are no quality classes in the proper sense of the
word. However, there is general agreement in these forward markets transactions as to which
characteristics are specified and which quality standards are used in the specification. 
The industry's established quality classes appear to play an important role in how the processing
firms define product quality and on the priority they give to the development of different
characteristics of the products. In product development the identification of an optimal trade-off
between these different quality characteristics was very much influenced by how the customs of
8The concept of search and experience goods was introduced by Nelson (1970), while the concept of credence3
goods was introduced by Darby and Karni (1973). In this paper, I regard a single product as having all three
characteristics.
payment in the industry as regards the trade-off between content of brix, color and clarity. In the
following section I bring in the measurement branch of transaction cost theory in order to examine
why standards may exert an influence on product development.
3. Transaction costs and product information costs
Goods may be interpreted as bundles of characteristics. The word "characteristics" owes it use in
economics to Lancaster (1966, 1971, 1979). A characteristic may be the quality, location, time
and availability of a product. I restrict the analysis to product characteristics which in the case of
fruits and vegetable could be taste, smell, colour, durability, nutritional value, and purity. The kind
of product characteristics I have in mind may be divided into the categories of search, experience,
and credence characteristics, depending on how easy it is for the consumer to experience the
characteristic at the time of purchase (Tirole, 1988) . Search characteristics can be observed3
directly. In the case of fruit and vegetables, this means size, shape and colour. Experience
characteristics can often only be evaluated or measured after the product has been consumed or
used in the production process. Consistency and taste are the two most important experience
characteristics of fruit and vegetables. Finally, credence characteristics are characteristics which
cannot be observed or experienced directly by looking at or inspecting the raw or final product.
The use of crop sprays and ecological grown are such examples of credence characteristics. 
The representation of goods as bundles of characteristics is in keeping with the property rights
perspective (Coase, 1960) and the measurement cost tradition (Barzel, 1983, 1985, 1987). Goods
may according to the property rights perspective be perceived as bundles of property rights where
the property rights in question consists of the rights to use or consume valued attributes, i.e.,
charateristics of an asset, to obtain income or utility from the asset and to alienate the asset.
Property rights in economics has most often been associated with so-called "intellectual property
rights", that is, the securing of rights over intangible assets. Property right analysis has, however,
a much broader application, since all transactions involve the exchange of property rights. For
example, if one buys a can of marmalade, one is in fact buying the right to alienate, consume or
obtain income from all the valued product characteristics of marmalade. 
When assets/goods are traded the rights over valued attributes are transferred at a price from the
seller of the good to the buyer. There are, however, costs to both parties of transferring the rights
and these cost depends on the cost of obtaining rightful product informations. 
9Value in the public domain often occurs when rights to the use of an asset are shared by many. For example,4
the right to use the hallway in an apartment building is shared by all tenants. Each may pay some to the owner
for that use. If no one has specified what this common space maybe used for by each of the tenant some of its
value has been placed in the public domain. Some tenants may gain this value if they gain greater use of the
space by for example, parking prams and childrens' toys in the hallway. They then gain more value for this
common space than they pay for.
Product information is broadly defined as information about the level of a characteristic per unit,
for example, the sweetness of a cherry, plus the number of products in a group with the same level
(e.g., the number of sweet cherries in a basket). Product informations are in themselves valuable
characteristics of products, since presumably a buyer is not willing to pay a price which equals its
value to him unless he is convinced that the product has the characteristics that he values. 
Then, on a general level transaction costs may be defined as costs which arise when individual
agents want to exchange property rights over assets and thereafter enforce these rights. Such costs
may consist of cost of searching for transaction parties, negotiation costs, cost of controlling
products and monitoring parties in the transaction. If these transaction costs are sufficiently high
potential traders may abstain from engaging in exchange. According to Barzel (1985), transaction
problems arise precisely because it is difficult and costly to obtain precise information about all the
characteristics of a product:
"It is my contention that costly (intermediate and final) product information is
the central problem of transacting, leading to all other transacting problems"
(p.6). 
Barzel (1982, 1989) has argued that costs from rent capture attempts are particularly  predominant
if the value that an asset can generate is variable and not fully predictable. Put another way
transaction costs are particular predominant if products vary unpredictably with respect to those
characteristics that are valued by buyers. 
If product information was free, commodities with the same quality characteristics would be sold
at the same price. Alternatively if product information was not free but all variation in quality was
eliminated, buyers only needed to examine one product to know the quality of all products on
offer, and the quantity purchased by a buyer would reflect his cost of examining one product, his
preferences for the attributes of that product, and the price of the product (Barzel, 1982). 
When products such as, for example, cherries vary with respect to the level of quality and if it is
costly for a seller to precisely measure the quality of every single product, then high-quality
cherries will probably be sold at the same price as cherries of a lower quality. Thus, the seller has
placed some value of his product in the public domain that is for some of the cherries he charge
a price which is lower than which (at least) some buyers would have paid . Value in the public4
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Costs are opportunity costs. The competition between buyers then depends on their alternative costs of queuing5
and sorting and on the differences in their preferences for the same attributes of the products in the sample. 
In each round of search the cost of previous searches are sunk cost and do not influence the decision to go on6
searching.
domain results in rent capturing attempt since one or both parties spend resources in their attempts
to capture this value. Buyers for example confront an incentive to use resources to capture this
wealth in the public domain, for example, by spending time in queues and to search for cherries
of a higher quality than their price while sellers invest in sorting to avoid the gradual dissaperance
of the higher quality products from their distribution of offers.
In the following I shall indicate more precise how variations in product quality give raise
information costs and thus to transaction costs and how these costs may be reduced by the
introduction of quality standards. First, I examine the relation between transaction costs and
quality variation within one seller´s product offer and then how variation between differences
sellers influences transaction costs and competition between sellers. The exercise form the basis
for my argument that standards influence product development through their effect on those
transaction costs that arise as a consequence of product information costs and variability in
product quality. 
4. Transaction costs and variation in product qualities
If product information costs are low while at the same time the quality of the products varies
greatly from one unit to the next buyers face an incentive to sort among the products. This is
because buyers expected utility from search depends on their sorting effort and the cost of sorting.
Maximizing buyers will spend resources on such value capture until their marginal benefits equals
their marginal costs. Buyers' costs of sorting consist of a cost of obtaining information of the
valued attributes of a product and cost of competing against other consumers for access to the
goods. These costs in turn depends whether the valued characteristics are search, experience or
credence characteristics on the competition between buyers for the same underprices products .5
Buyers' benefits from sorting depend on the mathematical expected level of quality from random
search, their preferences for quality and their aversion toward risk 
Now, maximizing buyers will choose to continue sorting (depending on their preferences for
quality) whenever the expected benefit of another round of search is greater than the quality of the
item in hand. The expected benefit may be expressed as the mathematical expected quality
weighted by their preferences for high quality minus search costs . In each round of search the6
distribution of quality changes since some buyers are lucky and finds an item of a level of quality
sufficiently high that it does not pay for them to continue searching. 
11
Buyers on the whole will also win more from a better sorting of the products than they lose from not searching7
for underprices products.
If seller raise buyers costs of obtaining information about valued quality characteristics buyers may suspected8
sellers of cheating. The price (under competition) would fall to a level which reflected buyers' expectations of
quality. Honest sellers would then be punished economically. To prevent such externalities honest sellers may
have to signal their commitment to sell random selection of vegetables from an optimally sorted supply. Brands
It is then possible to calculate the expected level of quality for different distributions. The expected
utility will be greater the higher the variance, the more positively screwed the distribution of
quality, and the lower the number of buyers that search per round compared to the number of
items in the distribution. (The expected utility for the first group of buyers also depends on
whether new buyers are allowed to perform search before the first group have finished searching).
Preferences for quality and risk aversion influence buyers expected utility from search in different
distributions. If buyers have high preferences for quality they favor those offerings which have a
high mean, or, alternatively, if they face low cost of search a large variance (indicating a
probability of finding a very high quality product). If buyers are risk averse their search will be
influenced in favor of distributions with lower variability in quality. 
 
Sellers may then increase their income if they can measure and grade products into uniform groups
better and more cheaply than buyers, since then they can capture some of the resources buyers
waist on such rent capture attempts . Moreover, if sellers' can eliminate buyers searching they need7
not continually reduce their price as the higher quality products are sold. Maximizing sellers will
sort until the point where their marginal costs equal their marginal gains of sorting. However,
sellers' gains to sorting depend on buyers' gains and costs of sorting. This is because the dissipation
of value depends on how many resources each buyer will spend on queuing and sorting. Now, if
sellers indicate the level of quality by means of reliable quality standards, buyers' cost of sorting
may be substantially reduced and buyers may find it worthwhile to sort more extensively, such that
more value is dissipation relative to the situation in which quality standards were non existent.
Quality standards may, however, also reduce sellers costs of sorting, such that this dissipation of
value is avoided. Moreover, product information costs influence the price buyers are willing to pay
for a product, since presumably for a buyer to pay the price reflecting his preference, he need some
sort of confirmation about the quality of the product. In other words, product information may
command a risk premium. Finally, by indicating the level of quality in each product, sellers may
also make it easier for buyers to compare their distributions and prices. 
Most often products contain a large number of valued characteristics which makes it impossible
and too expensive for sellers to eliminate all variation in quality by sorting and some buyers may
therefore still find in attractive to engage in sorting. In such a situation, sellers might be tempted
to disregard quality standards in order to increase buyers' costs of sorting. But since product
informations are valued attributes of products, the marginal benefits from avoiding dissipation of
value may be less than the marginal cost in terms of a loss of a valued attribute . Thus, some sellers8
12
can function as such a signal, since systematic shortcomings in the seller's products undermine the value of the
brand (see Klein & Leffler,1981).
If both buyer and seller use the same technical standards as units of reference, it also reduces the degree of9
asymmetrical information, since it creates the basis for a control of the deliveries. This also means that it is
easier for the buyer to protect his rights in the transaction.
Provided that buyers have the same preference ordering regarding the different quality characteristics of the10
products.
may seek to avoid such dissipation of value by restricting consumers choice or by increasing
buyers costs of determining the level of quality of those characteristics which do not enter as
criterias of sorting. However, in either case the seller will have to convince the buyer that he does
not take advantage of the asymmetry in information to perform an adverse selection of quality .9
A brand, with which a sufficient number of buyers have accumulated trust, and for which they
therefore are willing to pay a higher price can function as such a guarantee. Sellers who produce
products of high quality but have not accumulated sufficient trust in their brand name, may prefer
to indicate the quality of their products by means of quality standards, since by indicating the true
level of product quality they reduce competition from producers of low quality products.
Normally buyers carry out their shopping for a product in two steps: first, they decide which seller
to buy from, and second, then they select the products they want to buy from the sample of same
products on offer. If buyers have no cost of identifying and comparing the quality distribution of
all sellers' offers, sellers will have to charge a price reflecting the mean and variance of quality in
their offers. Moreover, if all buyers have the same preferences for quality, the same opportunity
costs of sorting and the same aversion toward variability, all sellers facing the same sorting costs
would sort equally fine. 
Now, different sellers may have different costs of sorting and thus attract buyers with different
opportunities costs of sorting and aversion toward variation. However, as long as buyers can easily
compare the quality distribution of the sellers, their prices will always reflect such differences .10
If, however, buyers face costs of determining different sellers distribution and of comparing their
offerings, the market may not be functioning well. Some sellers with offers of low mean and high
variance may get away with charging a higher price than if such costs were non existent. Some of
those costs which buyers face may arise because when products contain may valued
characteristics, sellers may sort their product according to different criteria. Such a sorting practice
implies that buyers have to spend more resources on determining the value of different sellers'
offerings before purchase.
 
To sum up, I suggest that they are classified according to whether the information they contain
helps reduce the transaction costs of:
13
Sometimes it is relatively easy for buyers to decide whether a product belongs to one product category or11
another; for example, it is easy to tell the difference between peas and other vegetables. It can be difficult for
consumers to tell the difference between "real juice" and other juice, or between different kinds of carrots,
however. In the former case, product standards are hardly likely to contribute much to a reduction in transaction
costs but they still contribute to a reduction in communication costs.
1) Evaluating and ensuring a product's search, experience and credence
characteristics;
2) Comparing the distribution of search, experience and credence characteristics in
different sellers' offers.
Quality standards
 then help reduce buyers cost of evaluating and ensuring their rights over
product quality characteristics and of comparing the quality distribution of different sellers.  
Product standards
 likewise have two functions. First, they contribute to reduce buyers' costs of
comparing different sellers' offerings of desired quality characteristics (consumers can just compare
products in the same category), and second, they reduce a buyer's costs of evaluating a seller's
distribution of quality characteristics over time . Product standards should not be confused with11
registered titles of specific product classes within a product category, however, the main aim of
which is to secure title owners an extra economic return (scarcity rent). One example of this is
French wine, where the use of "titles", such as Bourgogne or Bordeaux, is reserved for wine
growers within a strictly defined geographical area. The possibility that such titles can have a
transaction cost function cannot be ruled out, however, since the "title's value" depends on the
producers who use it not cheating on quality. 
Finally, quality classes like product standards contribute to a reduction in transaction costs, since
they make it easier for buyers to compare different sellers' products.
The economic benefits of using a particular standard (be it quality standards, product standards
or quality classes) depends in part on how widely it is used in the industry (or economy). If it is
widely used, then buyers can more easily compare the prices and quality level of different sellers'
offerings, which is an advantage for sellers of high-quality products. This can be illustrated by the
production of jam, where the proportion of berries is an important quality attribute. If, for
example, Danish and American producers declare the weight of the berries in different units of
weight, it will be harder for consumers to compare quality vis-à-vis price than if they had used the
same units. This could make it easier for sellers of lower-quality jam to get consumers to buy their
products, even though their price is high compared with the quality. If one standard is widely used
buyers may altogether avoid buying from seller that do not comply to that standard. This is
because the probability of finding a seller with an above average quality compared to price may
be so little that it out-weights the extra cost of comparing his distribution with other seller. In that
case the standard is self-enforcing even in markets with many low quality-producers. 
14
This argument is based on Schmalensee (1982). In his model of product differentiation and advantages of12
pioneering brands he agues that the is a risk-cost factor which influence  consumers' valuation of the
challenging product given pretrial uncertainty about its quality characteristics relative to the post trial valuation.
In order to overcome this barrier to switching sellers may have to reduce price substantially for a period. The
existence of reliable standards with which to indicate the true quality of a product may reduce the risk-cost
factor of switching. 
Such "increasing returns to use" or "system scale economic" appear to be the case also for product
standards and quality classes. For example, if only a few sellers grade their peas by size, buyers
get much less out of it, because they will still incur costs of comparing graded peas with non-
graded peas. If all sellers graded peas using size as the main criterion, however, buyers' costs of
comparing mean and variation in quality relative to price would be much lower.
5. Quality standards and product development
The emergence of quality standards influences the number of product characteristics that can be
specified. The extent to which quality standards and measurement methods exist may in particular
influence sellers' incentives to invest in complex product developments. This is because, if no
quality standards exists buyers face larger costs of determining the level of the new kind of product
characteristics and may for that reason not be willing to pay a price that fully reflects the value
they place on the characteristic. In particular, if the characteristic is an experience characteristic
it may require substantial reduction in price (because of the risk of lower utility compared to the
previous purchased goods) in order that a sufficient large group of consumers test and accepted
the improved product . With respect to credence characteristics the development of quality12
standards is the only way of communicating the new feature of the product.
The existence of widely used quality standards may also influence some sellers' incentive to
perform vertical product development that is, increase the level (or rather the mean value) of all
quality charateristics. This is especially true for seller who do not possess a brand name. The
existence of widely used quality standards makes it easier for buyers to compare different sellers
levels of product quality, making competition between sellers of high and low quality products
function in favor of the former.  
When looking at the whole chain of production it is possible that the extent to which there exists
quality standards and measurement methods for the raw and intermediate products quality
characteristics influence the costs of vertical, horizontal (the increasing of the mean value of some
of the quality charateristics) as well as complex product developments (adding new quality
charateristics) of the final product. The improvements or development of new quality
characteristics of the final product often depend on changes in the raw product's quality
characteristics. For example, it will be much more costly to improve the quality characteristics of
15
the final product if this means a lot of new demands on the raw product for which no quality
standards exists. The opposite is also true: new quality standards for the raw product can make
it easier to develop new characteristics in the final product. One example of this could be the
spread of IP standards among growers. The formulation of technical and behavioral standards
underlying the concept of IP, as well as a set of control procedures, is one of the ways in which
growers can document the credibility characteristic "environmentally friendly". Under IP,
everything about the crop is recorded, from before planting to final consumption - even storage
conditions are controlled, because IP crops must not be mixed with other crops. If IP evolves into
a credible standard, it reduces firms' needs to monitor and control the growing conditions of the
raw products. Finally, it should be mentioned that the most widely spread quality standards also
influence the technological development of the measuring equipment.
6. Product standards and product development
Product standards constitute the minimum threshold values for product categories which must be
met before a product can be sold as a particular category of product. Product standards thus
influence transaction costs in the sense that they narrow the range of products which the buyer
regards as a relevant basis for comparing the relationship between price and quality. 
The lack of product standards thus influences competition within an industry by increasing cost
of comparing sellers offers, and can therefore result in a poorly functioning market for products
with certain experience and credence characteristics. For example, if it is difficult for consumers
to tell the difference between the various product categories, it can be necessary to introduce
product standards to protect them. 
The absence of product standards can, in turn, affect producers' incentives to develop new product
lines. An imaginary example from the market for squash can help illustrate this. Imagine that there
are several kinds of squash on the market: one which contains 100% pure fruit juice, one where
the fruit juice is mixed with citric acid, and one where the fruit taste is synthetically produced. All
these different products are sold as squash. Buyers who at a given price prefer a squash with 100%
fruit content (which in this case is an experience characteristic) will have to tests several items in
order to find the preferred one. Such costs will reduce the amount a buyer is willing to pay for the
product compared to a situation in which he do not have to search. Since every buyer has to
search, much value will be dissipated. 
Also, without product standards variation is much greater with respect to all quality
characteristics. This implies that more resources will be spent on comparing the quality and prices
of different offerings. The more costly it is for buyers to compare different sellers' quality vis-à-vis
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price, the easier buyers are persuaded to pay a higher price than the product's quality
characteristics warrants. The market might even be distorted in favor of those producers who
mixed in citric acid. Without registered titles, therefore, it can be difficult for producers to protect
the value of the characteristic "real juice", which explains why economic incentives to develop real
juice products are relatively limited. Finally, with high costs of comparing sellers' offers, buyers
may only be willing to pay a lower price that which reflect their reservations price without such
costs. This in turn could make the production of some high quality variants not profitable. 
With the introduction of product standards, search is reduced to a search for juice which contains
the highest possible level of valued quality characteristics other than content of fruit. In the above
example, if a product standard for real juice emerged, then the various suppliers of juice would
compete among themselves on search, experience, and credence characteristics, while juice
producers as a group would compete with producers of various squash drinks. This is because the
setting of standards for juice reduces buyers' costs of comparing sellers' products within a given
product category, which at the same time increases price competition within this category, whereas
competition between different product categories will, to a greater extent, develop into a struggle
to persuade consumers to substitute one type of product for another. 
Product standards have much influence on firms' development of entirely new product lines by
complex product development
 since the kind of characteristic that a product possesses may place
it in a very different product category. But product standards may also influence firms' vertical
product development
 since also the level of quality characteristics may determine to which product
category the product belongs and thus the basis for comparison with other sellers products. 
Finally, I will mention a very different way in which product standards may influence the economic
incentives to carry out product development. Sometimes appropriation possibilities in the form of
patent rights can depend on whether product development takes account of the way in which a
product's defining standards are determined. An example of this can be found in the production
of new plant varieties, since, by law, a new variety of garden plant can only be defined as a variety
if it can be proved to have stable, consistent, and separate phenotypical characteristics. This means
that, if the development of a plant's functional characteristics (for example, resistance to disease)
do not have a direct influence on the phenotypical characteristics which define the variety, it can
not be patented as a new variety. In this case, the standard which defines a variety limits incentives
to improve the plant through breeding.
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Product standards can be necessary if the classification of products into quality classes is to reduce variations13
in quality characteristics, and thus also transaction costs. This is because, in the absence of product standards,
it can be too easy to cheat on quality in a given quality class. One example of this - which, however, is from
outside the fruit and vegetable industry - is the quality differentiation of English steak. Since there are no
product standards for which cuts of meat can be called English steak, it is impossible to achieve any kind of
credibility for a classification of English steak into a first or second class on the basis of the quality
characteristics (for example, colour and tenderness) of the meat alone. An increased demand for English steak
would merely result in them being taken from different cuts of meat, which in turn will increase the variations
in all the quality characteristics not directly specified in the quality class.
7. Quality classes and product development
In many respects, quality classes have the same economic function as product standards, since they
too lower costs of comparing sellers' quality distributions . Now, imagine a buyer who has to13
choose between buying at a seller where he knows his expected utility from searching or at a seller
where he does not know the distribution of quality characteristics and thus not his expected utility
from searching. Such a buyer is put in a situation where he has to do some experimental search
in the offering of the seller not known to him in order to determine which of the offers is better
(in terms of expected utility). The cost involved in determining the expected utility from searching
in different sellers offerings depends on the sampling necessary to determine the distribution (with
some level of confidence) and the different sellers offers and the degree of variety (in terms of
mean and spread of different quality characteristics) between different sellers offers. If sellers sort
their products according to the same criterias this latter factor in the cost function is reduced. The
ability of quality classes to reduce transaction costs appreciably therefore depends strongly on the
number of sellers who classify their products after the same criteria. The more sellers who use the
same quality classes, the fewer resources buyers have to use to compare different sellers' offerings.
And the fewer the resources buyers use, the greater are sellers' advantage in sorting into quality
classes. 
Such "system scale economies" (David, 1987) can help in spreading specific norms for classifying
products with different levels of quality characteristics into quality classes. At the same time,
however, system scale economies lead to a certain reluctance to change the criteria by which
quality classes are defined. It is especially thanks to this "inertia" that well-established quality
classes and associated quality standards for trade are able to nudge horizontal product
development
 in particular directions, since there will be far fewer transaction costs involved in
selling products which have been developed according to the specifications laid down in the most
widely-used quality classes.
If, for example, size is the prime criterion for dividing peas into quality classes and colour the
secondary, then sellers will have a greater incentive to develop pea size rather than colour
(assuming that buyers attribute all quality characteristics the same value).
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The influence of quality classes on product development is obvious, if a seller's products are mixed
with other sellers' products before they are sorted into quality classes. A seller who has developed
peas with, on average, a better colour, but whose size places them in the class of medium-sized
peas, must sell them as medium-sized peas. As it is impossible for buyers to identify any individual
seller, he has no incentive to improve any characteristics other than those that places his product
in a higher quality class. This is because the price his peas can command depends on buyers'
expectations of mean and variance in quality of all the valued characteristics of the products. An
improvement in some sellers product quality increases the mean implying a higher price. However,
since individual sellers cannot be identified the innovator will have to share the profits with all
other sellers. 
In the above example the influence of quality classes on product development had nothing to do
with the economic of system scale from increased use of a quality class. Now, buyers need not pull
their products in a common offer. The innovator may sort his products according to the criterias
set for different quality classes. A buyer will then compare his peas with other peas in the quality
class "medium-sized". Within this class, he will have a quality advantage (the colour) which should
fetch him a higher price for his peas (once buyers recognize the difference between the offerings).
The price he can get will not reflect the full value of the improved colour, however. This is due
to the fact that it is more costly for buyers to evaluate the colour of the peas compared with that
of competitors' peas. If, instead, he had developed a production method which guaranteed him a
pea size which matched that of class 1 peas, he would have realized a much larger part of the value
of this effort, since buyers' costs are much lower for transactions involving this characteristic.
Alternatively, he could have chosen to protect the value of the "colour" of peas by grading after
this characteristic. If a seller tries to grade his peas differently, so that colour, not size, is the main
criterion, buyers will use more resources in trying to find out whether the seller's quality matches
what they could get for the same price from other sellers. It thus seems reasonable to assume that
the very hierarchical organization of quality classes can influence the priority sellers give to the
development of different quality characteristics of the final product.
Quality classes may also influence vertical product development. This may be illustrated by
continuing the imaginary example from the market for squash: Without the existence of quality
classes, the total offering of juice will include both products with high levels of valued quality
characteristics and products with low levels of the same characteristics. In the case where the
valued characteristics were search characteristics, this would result in value dissipation through
excessive sorting. In cases where the valued characteristics were experience characteristics, one
could expect a "lemon effect". If, for example, consumers value fruit taste in juice and if juice with
more or less fruit taste is sold at the same price, buyers would not know in advance which kind
of juice they were buying. Gradually, however, they would develop a feeling for the likelihood of
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getting a juice with fruit or synthetic taste. Since their demand depends on their expectations of
quality, the price will gradually fall, and since at the same time the supply of juice with fruit taste
must be presumed to depend on the price, this will also fall. After a certain period of time,
therefore, buyers will adjust their expectations of quality downwards, and so on. The end result
of this chain reaction can be that all production of real juice ceases, even though there is a demand
for it (Akerlof, 1970). 
In the above example, a declaration of contents of the various juices, combined with a producer's
brand as a signal of credibility, could reduce the problem of asymmetrical information. It would
still be very costly for buyers to compare different sellers' quality and distribution of many product
characteristics. This is because the basis for comparison is much larger and much more varied than
if there had been three different quality classes. 
8. Changes in the hierarchy of sorting criteria in quality classes
Since quality classes appear to influence vertical and horizontal product development through the
priority producers gives to product development efforts, it is pertinent to examine the possibilities
for changes in the hierarchy of criteria for sorting into quality classes. 
The question is which product characteristics form the basis for sorting along the criteria which
make up a quality classes, and which factors could conceivably change the hierarchy of sorting
criterias. On the face of it, it would seem reasonable to assume that those product characteristics
which vary strongly in quality level from product to product, and which at the same time are
valued most by the majority of buyers, will underlie the hierarchical organization in classes. This
is supported by the presumption that maximizing buyers will use many resources in comparing
sellers' products for the quality characteristics they value the most. Reducing the variation of
precisely these characteristics in a seller's product range "saves" most resources in the transaction.
Precisely which characteristics will be in demand is often historically determined, however. When
buyers come across a new product in the frozen food counter, for example, they are not likely to
be able to make snap judgements on its price and quality compared with competing products. An
important factor of demand is the development of buyers' concept of the product. Consider peas.
The first time buyers come across frozen peas, they will try to evaluate them by placing them in
the category "green vegetables". This doesn't give much indication of buyers' preferences for
different qualities of peas, however. After buying them a few times, some buyers might develop
the idea that colour is crucial to the taste. Other consumers make the same discovery. Gradually,
buyers discover that peas of different size require different boiling times to get an optimal taste,
or they develop a special liking for small peas in some meals and large peas in others. In time,
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variations in pea colour and size become parameters after which they sort packets of peas or
choose between different sellers' products. Only after a longer learning period will they develop
an actual concept of the product which will enable them fairly quickly (and at less cost) to evaluate
the product's quality (Clark, 1985). It is possible, therefore, that demand, and with it the value of
different quality characteristics, changes over time as consumers gradually develop their concept
of the product.
Variability and demand are not the only factors of importance for the economic benefit of sorting,
however; sellers' costs of grading the peas after specific criteria are also important. Such costs
depend in part on the development of quality standards and measurement methods for the
characteristics.
These arguments lead to the hypothesis that the quality characteristics which form the basis for
the hierarchical organization of quality classes are primarily:
1) the valued search (and possibly experience) characteristics which are easy
and cheap for sellers to sort by, and
2) which at the same time are difficult for buyers to evaluate, because they vary
widely from one unit to the next.
The sources of change in quality classes should thus be found partly in changes in buyers'
preferences and partly in the development of better and cheaper measurement and sorting
methods. It is reasonable to assume, however, that there is some difference in the way in which
quality classes are changed for raw products and final products respectively, because firms'
demand for particular quality characteristics in raw or input products is to a large extent also
determined by production considerations. The diffusion of a new production technology can thus
also be a source of change in a standard's specifications.
However, quality classes and standards' specifications seem to be quite stable. New product
characteristics, for example, credence characteristics, are often just added to the hierarchies or
they defined a new product standard. There are good reasons for such stability, since it would be
costly for buyers to have to get to know new quality classes. The more often the criteria for class
1 peas are changed, the more resources buyers have to use, both in evaluating the individual
seller's products and in comparing different sellers' products. Furthermore, it will take time for a
new standard for sorting to spread to all firms. It will thus also take time for the same "system
scale economic" benefits to emerge under the new standard as under the old standard.
While it may be difficult to change the order of priority of quality characteristics in quality classes
without incurring new transaction costs, the characteristics themselves are not totally
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In the case of credence charateristics investigations may be an more appropritate describtion of the kind of14
activities necessary for consumers to validate the charateristics.
unchangeable. Stricter criteria for first or second class quality can be introduced without this
incurring significantly greater transaction costs. Such stricter  criteria for sorting within fixed
quality classes (standard variation) must be presumed to stem from competition, which forces
firms to differentiate on quality by making tougher demands on the minimum level and maximum
variation of quality. In time, these tougher firm-specific demands on the raw product can spread
to other firms, and thereby end up as a change in the standard.
9. Conclusion
Quality standards, product standards, and quality classes can all serve a general cost-minimizing
purpose, since they can be regarded as codes which make it easier for the economic agents to
specify those product characteristics they want. As I have argued, thes standars may also exert an
influece on product development. The influence of quality standards on product development is
mainly due to their function as a means of specifying valuable product characteristics. Such
standards make it easier for sellers to delineate and to protect the value of new characteristics.
Quality standards may be particular important if the new charateristic is an experince and
credencce charateristics since without quality standards experince  will be in the only way in14
which buyers can evaluate the charateristics. quality standard also makes it possible to sort
products into more homogeneous categories, thus limiting value dissipation from searches.
The influence of product standards and quality classes on product development is first and
foremost due to their ability to reduce buyers' costs of comparing different sellers' quality. This
reduces sellers' incentives to cheat on quality, and makes it easier for honest sellers to realize an
economic benefit from development efforts aimed at increasing the level of their products' search,
experience, and credence characteristics. Quality classes, which consist of hierarchies of criteria
for classifying products into groups, also influence the priority the firm gives to further
development of particular product characteristics.
The relation between standards and product development is summarized in table 1 below.
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Table 1: Standards and product development
Product             Standards Influences
development        
Vertical product standards Influence which
quality classes characteristics will be
quality standards Improve competition in
improved. 
favor of those sellers with
products of high mean
quality.
Horizontal product standards Influence development
quality classes Influence the ratio of
quality standars Improve competition in
efforts by setting threshold
value for defining product
categories.
characteristics. 
favor of those sellers with
products of high mean
quality.
Complex quality standards Makes delineation of rights
product standards Influence development
over new attributes
possible.
efforts by setting threshold
value for defining product
categories.
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